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NOTES
AERIAL NAVIGATION IN THE LAW OF TRESPASS
The law of trespass will undoubtedly be greatly modified in the
next few years by the rapid advancement of the science of aviation.
One of the legal questions arising from this incx'ease of air traffic is:
Whether a landowner, having been damaged by the landing or falling
of an airplane or article dropped from an airplane, need show negli-
gence in the operator of the craft in order to recover for the damage
sustained. This will, of course, depend on whether it is trespass per se
to fly over another's land.' If it is trespass to so pass over, even with-
out damage to the occupant of the soil, then, of course, negligence
need not be shown where damage does actually occur. It is my pur-
pose to review the authorities on this question, and to draw therefrom
some conclusions as to how the law will adjust itself in this regard.
By the common law of England the owner of the surface of the
land was also held to be the owner of all inanimate matter above and
below his close: Cujuo est rolsm e juss est usque ad corlum et ad
inferos2 This rule of great antiquity and weight stood practically
without dispute until the early part of the nineteenth century. In
1815 Lord Ellenborough expressed a doubt that this maxim should
be strictly construed in regard to the upper air." He "thought that
it was not in itself a trespass to interfere with the column of air super-
incumbent on the close"' and that the owner or occupant could only
recover for actual damage. This view, as will be shown later, has met
with some favor from modern legislators. Fifty years later Lord
Blackburn thought differently and returned solidly to the common law
rule as being the better founded in law. He "saw the good sense" in
Lord Ellenborough's doubt, but not "the legal reason for it."' Courts
since Lord Blackburn have been inclined to uphold his opinion and
1. Cooley on Torts, Sec. 162; Pollock Torts, p. 341.
2. "Whose is the land, his is also to be heavens and to the lowermost
regions." 2 Black. Com. 18; 3 Kent Com. 401; 1 Woody & Malkin 112; Coke
Litt. 4a; Broom Leg. Max. (8th Ed.) 309.
3. Pickering v. Rudd I Starkle 56 (1815), where Lord Ellenborough ex-
pressed the doubt, obiter, that a projecting board or a balloon drifting over
the land would give rise to cause of action unless there was Inconvenience
to the occupier of the land.
4. Pollock on Torts 281.
5. Kenyon v. Hart 6 B. and S. 249 (1865).
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have so decided in the cases of overhanging trees,s projecting eaves,'
bullets fired over the land of the complainant,' and wires strung across
such land.* The leading American case, wherein the right of a land
holder to non-interference with the air above his soil is discussed, is
Hannabalson v. Sessions. ° Apart from judicial precedent this right has
been recognized by the telegraph statutes in Missouri. Thus the com-
mon law theory of ownership to the heavens is substantially in force
today.
But, while the maxim usque ad coelum is still in effect in a broad
sense, yet there have been modifications and limitations of it which
will be enlarged in developing the law of aerial navigation. The one
limitation we are here concerned with is that of Sir Frederick Pollock:
"The most reasonable rule" would be that "the scope of possible tres-
pass is limited to that of effective possession."" Wh;le this doctrine
of effective possession does not flatly deny the maxim, so as upon
establishment to relieve the aerial traveler from all guilt of trespass,
it does originate a theory upon which the future air voyager may
reasonably expect to escape litigation except where he actually causes
damage. A recent expositor of Pollock's doctrine has said: "All of
truth there seems to be in the maxim of ownership to the sky is that,
within lines extended thru all points of soil, ownership to the sky is
6. Smith v. Giddy 2 K. B. 448 (1904) where it was held the owner of
land may cut the branches of trees overhanging his close to the boundary
line. Lenmon v. Webb 3 Ch. 1 (1894). allowing trees to overhang boundary
is a nuisance, 2 C. 1. 303. note 31a, "the owner of land commits no tort if he
cuts off the limbs of trees overhanging his land, although the trees them-
selves grow upon the land of another, since he is entitled to a free approach
to his land from above." Grandona v. Lovdal. 78 Cal. 611, 12 Am. S. R.
121; Hoffman v. Armstrong. 48 N. Y. 201; 38 Vt. 117; 1 Ld. Raym. 737; 38
Vt. 117; 1 Ld. Raym. 737.
7. Smith v. Smith. 110 Mass. 302 (1872). but this was so held on the
rule that the owner of the land was liable to lose title by prescription.
8. Clifton v. Bury. 4 T. L. R. 8 on which Pollock comments: "It would
be strange if we could object to shots being fired point blank across our land
only in the event of actual injury being caused." See also Lord Ellenbor-
ough's dicta in Pickering v. Rudd, supra.
9. In this last case it has been held the owner is entitled to damages for
trespass, or to an injunction or to damages in condemnation proceedings.
In Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co.. 186 N. Y. 486. ejectment lay though the soil
was not touched. In Wadsworth Board of Works v. United Tel. Co., L. R.
13 Q. B. D. 904 (1884), it was held to be trespass to string wires over the
close of another, though at a considerable height.
10. S. C. Iowa 1902, 116 Io. 458. It was held that it was not assault to
use reasonable force to remove an arm of the complainant which was hang-
ing over the boundary fence and over the defendant's land, because the pro-
jecting arm was a trespassisng of the person on realty.
11. Sec. 3327, R. S. Mo. 1909; 202 Mo. 656.
12. Pollock on Torts, 8th Ed., p. 348; and covenant thereon by A. K.
Kuhn Esq. in "The Beginning of Aerial Law," 4 Am. Journal of Interna-
tional Law 109 (1910).
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NOTES
a space of preferential use to the owner of the soil; and such use is
interfered with only when enjoyment of the soil is diminished."'I s Mr.
Kuhn remarks:
"It is hardly to be believed that courts will sanction any such
liberal application of the phrase (Usque ad coeltuiz. etc.) and it may be
assumed that, in the absence of statutory regulation, they will hold
that navigators of the air have the right to travel freely in any direc-
tion, so long as they inflict no injury on the property over which they
travel or upon the residents thereof.""' But this "scope of effective
possession," so strongly to be depended upon by the traveler of the
air, has never been determined; and will not be unless arbitrarily by
statute, since it must vary with the advance of aerial navigation.
The countries of continental Europe, before the advent of air
craft in numbers, followed a rule substantially the same as that of
the English common law.1' These countries have of recent years
recognized the necessity of providing in some way for the expansion
and development of the science. They have cast about for sore
theory upon which to hang their modifications of the u.sque ad coelum
rule, and have settled upon a holding analogous to Pollock's doctrine.
In France it is held that an aviator is not liable for trespass unless he
cause a loss of enjoyment in the land holder." This decision may well
have been arrived at by influence of the French penal code." Germany
and Switzerland have incorporated the doctrine of effective possession
into their statues. The German act1 ' says, "But the owner cannot
prohibit such interferences undertaken at such height or depth that he
has no interest in their prevention." The Swiss statute provides that,
"Property in land extends to the airspace (above) and the earth
beneath as far as these may be of productive value to the owner."'"
These laws well illustrate the modern tendency induced by the increase
of air traffic. Law makers are realizing that fliers must be dealt with,
and their science allowed to progress.
It will at once be noticed that the modern backers of Pollock's
doctrine, both judicial and legislative, do not attempt to abridge the.
land occupant's right after danage is done. None of them go so far
as to say that a man, causing from an air craft, injury or inconvenience
13. 71 Cen. L. J. 1.
14. 4 Am. J. Int. Law 126.
15. 2 Corpus Juris 304, note 41 (a).
16. 18 Va. L. Reg. 384.
17. Art. 471 French Penal Code, which holds that trespass on the
ground is only forbidden when it injures the owner.
18. Secs. 667-1900, German Civil Code (in effect 1912).
19. Sec. 165, Code of the Canton of Grisons (in effect 1862).
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to a holding beneath him is not liable. In the hypothetical case under
discussion the damage has occurred and it is the complainant's desire
to recover without having to show negligence. This he can do, because
the ancient rule has not been overthrown, and has been only tentatively
limited where no damage enters into the question. Even the radical
continental enactments excuse trespass only where the owner has no
interest in the exclusion of the trespasser. It would be absurd to say
to a man hit by the debris of an airplane, "You had vo interest in the
space wherein that plane was flying. It was very high." A body will
fall and do damage from any height which an aerial vehicle is capable
of attaining. When once the damage is done it will little avail the
trespasser to claim immunity because he was out of the zone of effec-
tive possession of the complainant. Yet this would substantially be
his position were he to attempt to hold the landowner to proof of
negligence.
It is submitted that the courts of this country will act upon the
question when it arises with an eye to substantial justice between the
parties. So if a man flies over my land so high as not to interfere
with my enjoyment thereof, then I am entitled to no substantial com-
pensation; but the instant he injures me then his trespass per se in so
flying relieves me of the necessity of showing negligence on his part.
This is an equitable rule, and will in all probability be adopted by the
legislative bodies when they come of necessity to act upon the subject.
WARDER RANNELLS.
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